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Abstract 
 
General renvoi clauses in DTAs based on article 3(2) of the 
OECD MTC provide that an undefined term in a DTA shall have 
the meaning that it has in the domestic law of the contracting 
state applying the DTA unless the context otherwise requires. All 
South African DTAs include such a clause. 
Many interpretational issues remain with regard to the 
application and interpretation of general renvoi clauses. This 
article considers four of these issues in the light of South African 
cases in which general renvoi clauses were referred to. The 
following cases are considered: ITC 789 (1954) 19 SATC 434, 
Baldwins (South Africa) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
(1961) 24 SATC 270 and Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd 2012 3 All SA 15 (SCA).  
The first of the issues considered in the article is relevant in 
those cases where a DTA includes a general renvoi clause 
based on the pre-1995 version of article 3(2) and where 
amendments were made to a relevant domestic meaning after 
the conclusion of the particular DTA. These clauses do not 
expressly state whether the relevant domestic meaning is the 
domestic meaning existing at the time of the conclusion of the 
DTA, or at the time of the application of the DTA.  
The second issue arises if the expression used in the domestic 
law is not identical to the undefined treaty term. The question is 
whether the expression in the domestic law can be used to give 
meaning to the treaty term under the general renvoi clause.  
Another interpretational issue considered in the article concerns 
deeming provisions in the domestic law. The issue is whether a 
meaning that a term is deemed to have under a provision in 
domestic legislation can be used under the general renvoi 
clause to give meaning to the undefined term in the DTA. 
The last issue deals with the meaning of the phrase "unless the 
context requires otherwise". The question raised is whether this 
phrase means that the domestic meaning should be given only 
as a "last resort", or whether it should apply unless "reasonably 
strong" arguments to the contrary are made. 
Keywords 
Article 3(2); general renvoi clauses; ITC 789; Baldwins; 
Tradehold.  
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1 Introduction 
South African double taxation agreements (DTAs) generally adhere in many 
respects to the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD MTC).1 
The OECD MTC defines only a few of the terms used therein and, in respect 
of the interpretation of undefined terms, includes the general renvoi clause, 
article 3(2). All South African DTAs also include a version of this clause.2 
Article 3(2) currently reads as follows:3 
As regards the application of the Convention at any time by a Contracting 
State, any term not defined therein shall, unless the context otherwise requires 
or the competent authorities agree to a different meaning pursuant to the 
provisions of Article 25, have the meaning that it has at that time under the 
law of that State for the purposes of the taxes to which the Convention applies, 
any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State prevailing over a 
meaning given to the term under other laws of that State. 
The inclusion of a provision in a treaty that deals with the interpretation of 
undefined terms is somewhat unusual,4 but there are a number of reasons 
for including such a provision in treaties aiming to grant relief against 
international juridical double taxation.5 There is, namely, a need for DTAs to 
closely interact with the contracting states' domestic tax laws, since DTAs 
place a restriction on the contracting states' right to levy taxes under these 
domestic tax laws.6 If the domestic laws change, which they frequently do, 
                                            
* Enelia Jansen van Rensburg. BA Law LLB (US) LLM Taxation (UCT) LLD (UP). 
Senior Lecturer, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. E-mail: enelia@sun.ac.za. 
This article emanated from research that the author conducted relating to her LLD 
dissertation at the University of Pretoria. The financial assistance of the National 
Research Foundation (NRF) towards this research is hereby acknowledged. The 
opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not 
to be attributed to the NRF. 
1  Hattingh "South Africa" 238-239. He also points out that South African DTAs typically 
deviate from the OECD MTC with regard to those provisions in respect of which 
South Africa has noted a position on the OECD MTC. South Africa, as a non-member 
of the OECD, is allowed to note its position on the articles of the OECD MTC and 
the Commentaries to the OECD MTC. South Africa has not noted a position with 
regard to art 3(2) of the OECD MTC or the Commentary pertaining to that article. 
2  Article 3(2) of the OECD MTC has been amended a number of times over the years. 
The wording of a general renvoi clause included in a particular DTA is usually based 
on the version of art 3(2) that was included in the OECD MTC during the time that 
the DTA was negotiated. Baker Double Taxation Conventions para E.20 mentions 
some of the terms commonly used to refer to these clauses. 
3  The OECD MTC as at 21 November 2017. 
4  Avery Jones et al 1984 BTR (I) 16; Baker Double Taxation Conventions para E.19. 
5  The title and preamble to the OECD MTC (2017) include the granting of relief against 
international double taxation as one of the objects of a DTA. Also see Gutuza 2016 
SA Merc LJ 491. 
6  Avery Jones et al 1984 BTR (I) 17; De Broe International Tax Planning and 
Prevention of Abuse 263; Kandev 2007 Can Tax J 38; Rust "Article 3(2) OECD and 
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there also is a need for DTAs to adapt to these changes without requiring in 
each instance a renegotiation of the treaty.7  
The application and interpretation of general renvoi clauses raise numerous 
questions, many of which have been addressed by tax scholars and foreign 
courts. From a South African perspective, four of these issues in particular 
have been addressed in judgments by South African courts, and the aim of 
this article is to consider how the South African courts have dealt with these 
issues.8 The four issues are introduced in part 2 of this article. The 
introduction takes the form of a brief explanation of the conflicting views 
expressed by international scholars and foreign courts in respect of each 
issue. In the next part of the article, three South African reported judgments 
are analysed in order to ascertain the courts' view in respect of these issues. 
The article concludes in part 4 with findings on how these judgments aid the 
application and interpretation of general renvoi clauses in South African 
DTAs.  
2 Issues regarding the application and interpretation of 
general renvoi clauses considered in this article 
2.1 The ambulatory versus static approach 
In broad terms, article 3(2) provides that an undefined term in a DTA shall 
have the meaning that it has under the domestic law of the contracting state 
applying the DTA. In situations where the meaning in the domestic law 
changed after the DTA had been concluded, the issue arises as to which 
domestic meaning must be taken into account under this general renvoi 
clause: the meaning that existed when the DTA was concluded (a static 
approach), or the meaning that existed when the DTA was applied (an 
ambulatory approach)? These situations are not rare occurrences, given the 
fact that most states amend their domestic tax laws far more frequently than 
they renegotiate their DTAs. 
                                            
UN MC" 206 m.nr. 109; Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 4.3.1. Accordingly, 
Rust "Article 3(2) OECD and UN MC" 206 m.nr. 109 argues that treaty negotiators 
probably have the meanings under these domestic laws in mind when they are 
negotiating the treaty. 
7  Avery Jones et al 1984 BTR (I) 16. 
8  It is acknowledged that there are many other aspects relating to the interpretation of 
undefined terms in DTAs and general renvoi clauses themselves that are central to 
the process of giving meaning to these undefined treaty terms and general renvoi 
clauses. It is also acknowledged that there are other issues pertaining to general 
renvoi clauses that are especially relevant from a South African perspective. Gutuza 
2016 SA Merc LJ 497, for example, raises questions regarding the interaction 
between these clauses and s 233 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996. Also see Du Toit and Hattingh "Beneficial Ownership" para 9.13. 
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Since 1995, article 3(2) has made it clear that the relevant domestic 
meaning is the meaning "at that time"; that is, at the time of application of 
the DTA. If a DTA includes a post-1995 version of the general renvoi 
clause,9 it is thus clear that an ambulatory approach should be taken. There 
are, however, still a substantial number of DTAs, including DTAs concluded 
by South Africa, that include a pre-1995 version of the general renvoi clause 
and that accordingly do not expressly prescribe either the static or the 
ambulatory approach.10 In respect of these DTAs the question thus remains 
whether the static or the ambulatory approach should be adopted.  
According to Du Toit and Hattingh, the static approach was the approach 
prescribed under "the international law of treaties" in the period prior to the 
1995 amendment of article 3(2).11 There was also foreign case law in 
support of the static approach during this period, notably the Canadian case 
of R v Melford Development Inc (Melford Development).12 One of the main 
arguments in favour of the static approach in preference to the ambulatory 
approach is that the latter may give a contracting state the ability to change 
the effect of a DTA by amending the meaning of a term under its domestic 
law. 
In contrast, there is also support for the ambulatory approach in respect of 
general renvoi clauses based on the pre-1995 version of article 3(2) in a 
number of foreign decisions13 and scholarly writings.14 The Commentaries 
to the OECD MTC (the Commentaries) have also stated since 1992 (thus 
after the Canadian decision in Melford Development mentioned earlier, but 
before the 1995 amendment to article 3(2) of the OECD MTC) that the 
ambulatory approach was the correct approach.15  
                                            
9  This refers to a clause based on the wording of art 3(2) of the OECD MTC after its 
amendment in 1995. Reference elsewhere in this article to the "pre-1995 version" of 
the general renvoi clause refers to clauses based on the wording of art 3(2) before 
its amendment in 1995.  
10  Du Toit and Hattingh "Beneficial Ownership" para 9.3 n 16. 
11  Du Toit and Hattingh "Beneficial Ownership" para 9.3 n 16. 
12  R v Melford Development Inc 82 DTC 6281, discussed by Avery Jones et al 1984 
BTR (I) 27-28 and 42-43; and Baker Double Taxation Conventions para E.23. 
13  See the cases mentioned in Baker Double Taxation Conventions para E.24 and 
Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 4.8.2.  
14  Wattel and Marres 2003b Euro Tax 223; Baker Double Taxation Conventions para 
E.25; Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 4.8.3. Also see Rust "Article 3(2) 
OECD and UN MC" 211 m.nr. 118 (where he states that there is "nearly a unanimous 
consensus" in this regard), and 214 m.nr. 129. For a discussion of the positions in 
various countries and those taken by various scholars, see Avery Jones et al 1984 
BTR (I) 42-46.  
15  Paragraph 11 of the Commentary to art 3, as it read from 23 July 1992. Since the 
Commentaries are not binding, however, this cannot be considered the final word in 
this regard. For the status of the Commentaries from a South African perspective, 
see Du Plessis 2012 SA Merc LJ; Du Plessis 2016 TSAR; and Burt 2017 BTCLQ. 
For the status of the Commentaries from an international perspective, see Avery 
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One of the arguments in favour of the ambulatory approach is that it may be 
too cumbersome to go back to "old law" continually,16 especially since DTAs 
typically have such long lifespans. Furthermore, if changes are made to the 
scope of a domestic tax liability after the conclusion of a DTA, the distributive 
rule in the DTA will follow the scope of the domestic tax liability only if an 
ambulatory approach is adopted. However, if the static approach is used in 
preference to the ambulatory approach, applying the limitation imposed 
under the DTA on a contracting state's right to tax a particular income 
stream may become problematic.17 Moreover, it might have been the 
intention of the contracting states when concluding the DTA that the 
meaning would change as domestic laws change, again in the context of 
DTAs' long lifespan.18 Lastly, the concern mentioned earlier that under the 
ambulatory approach a contracting state may change the effect of a DTA by 
amending its domestic law is addressed by the qualification in article 3(2) 
that the context may require that the amended domestic meaning not be 
used. Avery Jones thus argues that, when the amendment to the domestic 
meaning is aimed at enlarging the taxing jurisdiction of the contracting state 
making that amendment, the context may require that the amended 
domestic meaning not be used.19  
As a matter of practice in South Africa, the South African Revenue Service 
"tended to" follow the ambulatory approach already as early as in 1993, thus 
before the 1995 amendment to article 3(2) of the OECD MTC.20  
In part 3 this article considers whether South African case law has indicated 
a preference for the one approach over the other in respect of general renvoi 
clauses based on the pre-1995 version of article 3(2).  
                                            
Jones "Treaty Interpretation" paras 3.10-3.12. Another issue is whether 
amendments to the Commentaries made after the conclusion of a DTA should be 
taken into account when the DTA is interpreted. The issue is relevant with regard to 
those DTAs that were concluded before the 1992 amendment to the Commentaries 
mentioned in the main text. The issue is not addressed here, but is considered from 
an international perspective by Wattel and Marres 2003b Euro Tax 224-233; 
Linderfalk and Hilling 215 Nord Tax J 49-58; and Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" 
para 3.12. 
16  Avery Jones et al 1984 BTR (I) 41. Also see Wattel and Marres 2003a Euro Tax 71; 
Wattel and Marres 2003b Euro Tax 223; Rust "Article 3(2) OECD and UN MC" 211 
m.nr. 118. 
17  Rust "Article 3(2) OECD and UN MC" 211 m.nr. 118. Avery Jones et al 1984 BTR (I) 
41 add to this that DTAs will have to be amended more frequently if the static 
approach is followed.  
18  Baker Double Taxation Conventions para E.25. 
19  Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 4.6. Also see Avery Jones et al 1984 BTR 
(I) 40 and 48; Rust "Article 3(2) OECD and UN MC" 211 m.nrs. 118 and 119 and 213 
m.nr. 124. 
20  Eskinazi "Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions" 553. 
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2.2 The use of a different expression in the domestic law 
Article 3(2) provides that an undefined21 treaty "term" shall have the 
meaning that "it" has under the domestic law of the contracting state 
applying the treaty. Due to the fact that the OECD MTC serves as the basis 
for DTAs entered into by many different states, each with its own unique 
domestic tax legislation, the OECD MTC in many instances uses terms "of 
a wide nature".22 There is then often a divergence between the wide terms 
used in DTAs and the expressions used in the domestic (tax) law of the 
states that use the OECD MTC as the basis for the negotiation of their 
DTAs.23 
This gives rise to the following question: if an expression other than the 
treaty term is used in the domestic (tax) law, can the meaning of that 
expression in the domestic law be taken into account for the purposes of 
the general renvoi clause? The controversy lies in how the word "term" in 
article 3(2) should be interpreted - in particular whether it should include a 
"concept".24 Some scholars support this possibility and argue that the 
meaning of a different but comparable expression in the domestic law may 
thus be taken into account under article 3(2).25 However, this view is not 
shared by all,26 based on a more restrictive interpretation of the word "term". 
In part 3 below the article considers whether South African courts have 
taken a view on this issue. However, it must be emphasised that, even if the 
meaning of a different expression in the domestic law may indeed be taken 
into account under article 3(2), the treaty term will ultimately be given that 
domestic meaning only if the qualifications mentioned in part 2.4 below are 
met. 
                                            
21  Article 3(2) finds application only if a treaty term is "not defined" in the DTA. This 
criterion gives rise to its own interpretational issues, as mentioned by Kandev 2007 
Can Tax J 40 and Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 4.3.2.2. Also see the view 
of Mooij 2019 BTR 26 in respect of the meaning of the phrase.  
22  Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd 2012 3 All SA 
15 (SCA) para [18]. 
23  Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd 2012 3 All SA 
15 (SCA) para [18].  
24  Pijl 1997 BFIT 542. Also see Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 4.3.2.1. 
25  Déry and Ward "Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions" 277; Pijl 1997 BFIT 
542; Wattel and Marres 2003a Euro Tax 71; Engelen Interpretation of Tax Treaties 
488; Avery Jones "Interaction between Tax Treaty Provisions and Domestic Law" 
133-134; De Broe International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse 268; Avery 
Jones and Hattingh 2016 BTR 427; Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 4.3.2.1. 
For support in case law, see the cases discussed by Kandev 2007 Can Tax J 56-57; 
and Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 4.3.2.1. 
26  See the sources mentioned by Edwardes-Ker Tax Treaty Interpretation 83-84 and 
Pijl 1997 BFIT 542-543. In 1984, Avery Jones et al 1984 BTR (I) 20-21 concluded 
that there was not enough authority to draw conclusions in this regard. 
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2.3 The use of deeming provisions in domestic law 
Legislation often includes deeming provisions that give terms that appear in 
that legislation a meaning different from their usual (ordinary) meaning. The 
question that arises in the context of general renvoi clauses is whether 
deeming provisions that give meaning to terms in domestic legislation may 
also give meaning to treaty terms under general renvoi clauses. 
The main concern raised against this possibility is that deeming provisions 
may "neutralise" the application of a DTA by enabling treaty override in 
some circumstances, in that they may extend the tax jurisdiction of a 
contracting state.27 A number of scholars and foreign courts have 
nevertheless supported the possibility that deeming provisions may be 
taken into account under the general renvoi provision.28  
In part 3 below, the article considers whether South African courts have 
been prepared to take deeming provisions into account under general 
renvoi clauses. Here, too, it is important to emphasise that, even if the 
answer is that deeming provisions may be taken into account, the question 
whether the treaty term will in fact be given the deemed domestic meaning 
remains subject to the qualifications discussed in part 2.4 below. 
2.4 The domestic meaning as a "last resort" or as the "leading 
principle" 
Article 3(2) provides that a domestic meaning "shall" apply to give meaning 
to a treaty term "unless the context otherwise requires".29 Many issues arise 
with regard to the application and interpretation of this phrase.30 The issue 
                                            
27  Gutuza 2016 SA Merc LJ 501. Also see Gutuza 2008 SALJ 517. Note further the 
warning by Mooij 2019 BTR 28 that "[t]reaty terms that in negotiations look harmless 
may in practice, as a result of domestic definition, turn out to have very different 
meanings". This comment was made in response to the majority's finding in Fowler 
v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2018] EWCA Civ 
2544, where the UK Court of Appeal interpreted the UK-SA DTA. The majority in that 
case held that a deeming provision in UK domestic tax law had to be taken into 
account when interpreting that DTA. The majority referred at paras [42] and [47] to 
the general renvoi clause in the DTA. 
28  Pijl 1997 BFIT 543; De Broe International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse 
285. For examples of foreign case law in favour of this possibility, see the UK case 
referred to in the previous footnote and the Dutch case law discussed by De Pietro 
2015 World Tax J para 3.1 and Kandev 2007 Can Tax J 54-55, as well as the 
Canadian case discussed by the latter at 53-54.  
29  In 2017 a further qualification was added to art 3(2) of the OECD MTC. This reads 
as follows: "or the competent authorities agree to a different meaning pursuant to 
the provisions of Article 25". 
30  For example, it may be asked which factors are relevant when making this 
determination. There is probably a wide range of such factors, as discussed by Avery 
Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 5.1. Another issue concerns the meaning of 
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considered in this article is whether the approach of giving an undefined 
term in a treaty its meaning under domestic law in terms of a general renvoi 
clause is only "a last resort" or "the leading principle".31 
A number of scholars support the "last resort" view.32 They argue that one 
should not overemphasise the use of the words "shall" and "require" in 
article 3(2). Rather, the context and purpose of the DTA should take more 
prominence.33 Therefore, a DTA "must be interpreted from its own meaning 
and context [and] [o]nly if this does not yield an answer can one reach to 
domestic law as an interpretation aid."34 One of the fears in this regard is 
that the adoption of divergent domestic law meanings may result in one of 
the objects of DTAs, being the granting of relief against international juridical 
double taxation, not being achieved. The argument is that, should the 
source and resident states adopt divergent domestic law meanings with 
regard to the distributive rules provided for under the DTA, this might result 
in a conflict in the qualification of income. As a result, both states may tax 
the income, each under a different distributive rule, with the resident state 
refusing to grant tax relief in respect of the tax levied by the source state.35 
Proponents of the "leading principle" view place emphasis on the wording 
of article 3(2). They argue that the words "shall"36 (instead of "may") and 
                                            
"context" for the purposes of this clause, as discussed by Edwardes-Ker Tax Treaty 
Interpretation 76-79 and Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 5.1. 
31  These phrases are adopted by Mooij 2019 BTR 25-26 and Kandev 2007 Can Tax J 
n 29. This issue forms part of the wider topic of the interaction between the provisions 
dealing with the interpretation of treaties in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) and art 3(2), as discussed by Kandev 2007 Can Tax J 38-39.  
32  Mooij 2019 BTR 25 and see the sources listed by Avery Jones et al 1984 BTR (II) 
105-106; Edwardes-Ker Tax Treaty Interpretation 80-83; and Kandev 2007 Can Tax 
J n 29. 
33  See the summary of this argument by Kandev 2007 Can Tax J 39. 
34  Debatin and Walter, as quoted by Edwardes-Ker Tax Treaty Interpretation 80, but 
see Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation” para 5.1.2.2.6. Mooij 2019 BTR 25, for 
example, argues that "[t]reaty policies should aim at matching countries' different 
domestic tax rules with each other rather than preserving the domestic rules as much 
as possible, and treaty interpretation should aim to do likewise … .Treaties do not 
intend to preserve a right for countries to retain their own domestic definitions". 
35  Take the following example: the source state interprets the DTA based on the 
meaning that a term in the DTA has in its domestic law. As a result, the income falls 
within a distributive rule that grants the source state the concurrent right to tax that 
income. The resident state in turn interprets the DTA according to the meaning that 
that term has in its domestic law. Under this interpretation, the income falls within a 
different distributive rule, which grants it (the resident state) the exclusive right to tax 
the income. In this scenario, there is thus the possibility that both states will tax the 
income. Furthermore, the resident state may refuse to grant tax relief under either 
art 23A or art 23B of the OECD MTC since the source state had no right to tax the 
income in the first place, based on the resident state's interpretation of the DTA. The 
result may thus be international juridical double taxation. 
36  Van der Bruggen 2003 Euro Tax 153; Kandev 2007 Can Tax J 38; Olivier and 
Honiball International Tax 544. Also see Avery Jones 2019 BTR 24. 
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"requires"37 indicate a preference for the domestic meaning that can be 
dislodged only if there are "reasonably strong" arguments to the contrary.38 
With reference to the fear that international juridical double taxation may 
arise if divergent domestic meanings are adopted by the resident and 
source states, they point out that this risk has now fallen away "in nearly all 
instances" due to the development of a different understanding of the 
resident state's obligation to give tax relief under article 23A or article 23B.39 
Under this understanding, the resident state (if the resident state has a 
concurrent right to tax) is obliged to give tax relief in respect of taxes levied 
by the source state in those instances where it and the source state adopted 
different meanings for a treaty term due to divergent domestic meanings.40 
The risk of international juridical double taxation is thus reduced under this 
view. 
Avery Jones, who is a supporter of the "leading principle" view, notes that 
article 3(2) is not the only provision in the OECD MTC that includes the 
qualification "unless the context otherwise requires". A similar qualification 
is also included in article 3(1), which contains a list of definitions applicable 
                                            
37  Avery Jones et al 1984 BTR (II) 108 proposes that it is a word "of some force". 
38  Avery Jones et al 1984 BTR (II) 108. Van der Bruggen 2003 Euro Tax 153 notes that 
"the discordance" must be "sufficiently clear". Rust "Article 3(2) OECD and UN MC" 
212 m.nr. 123 notes that "weighty arguments" should be put forward if the domestic 
meaning is not used and see 212 m.nr. 122. At 212 m.nr. 123 Rust concludes that 
"interpretation contrary to the meaning a term has under domestic law must 
constitute an exception". Castro 2014 Intertax 715 argues that "strong arguments" 
are necessary to depart from a domestic meaning. Avery Jones "Treaty 
Interpretation" para 5.1.1 notes that "there must be a good reason to displace the … 
domestic law meaning … This means that a higher threshold than the balance of 
probabilities will prevail to displace the … domestic law meaning". Avery Jones 2019 
BTR 24 argues that "one starts and finishes with Article 3(2)". Also see De Broe 
International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse 277; Kandev 2007 Can Tax J 
68; as well as the sources listed by Edwardes-Ker Tax Treaty Interpretation 81-82. 
39  Rust "Article 3(2) OECD and UN MC" 206 m.nr. 109. However, Avery Jones "Treaty 
Interpretation" para 4.7.1 points out that some counties do not adhere to the view 
set out in the main text and that not all DTAs follow the current wording of art 23A 
and art 23B of the OECD MTC. Also see Baker Double Taxation Conventions para 
E.21. 
40  Under this view, the resident state is obliged to accept the source state's 
interpretation and grant relief under either art 23A or art 23B. Also see Kandev 2007 
Can Tax J 38; Rust "Article 3(2) OECD and UN MC" 209-210 m.nrs. 118-210 and 
211 m.nr. 120; and Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 4.7.1. Para 32.3 of the 
Commentary to art 23A and 23B currently provides as follows: "Where, due to 
differences in the domestic law between the State of source and the State of 
residence, the former applies, with respect to a particular item of income or capital, 
provisions of the Convention that are different from those that the State of residence 
would have applied to the same item of income or capital, the income is still being 
taxed in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, as interpreted and 
applied by the State of source. In such a case, therefore, the two Articles require that 
relief from double taxation be granted by the State of residence notwithstanding the 
conflict of qualification resulting from these differences in domestic law." 
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to the OECD MTC. Avery Jones argues that the reasons that would be 
required to overthrow a definition of a term under article 3(1) might have to 
be stronger than those required to overthrow a domestic meaning under 
article 3(2). The basis for his argument is that it is far less certain that the 
treaty negotiators agreed upon the domestic meaning than that they agreed 
upon a definition in article 3(1).41 
In part 3 this article considers whether South African case law is leaning 
towards an approach whereby treaty terms are given their meaning under 
domestic law in terms of general renvoi clauses only as a matter of "last 
resort", or whether such an approach is "the leading principle". 
3 South African case law in which reference was made to 
the general renvoi clauses in South African DTAs 
There have been occasions where a South African court has given an 
undefined term in a DTA the meaning that it has in South African domestic 
tax law without referring to the general renvoi clause in the applicable DTA. 
ITC 187842 is such an example. In this case, the court considered the South 
Africa-United States (US) DTA. One of the issues that arose was the 
interpretation of the following phrase in that DTA:43   
for a period or periods aggregating more than 183 days in any twelve-month 
period commencing or ending in the taxable year concerned.  
The OECD MTC and Commentaries,44 which the court consulted, use the 
expression "fiscal year" instead of "taxable year", but the court did not attach 
any importance to this difference in terminology. The term "fiscal year" is 
not defined in the OECD MTC and the OECD has proposed that its meaning 
be determined in accordance with article 3(2).45 It is not used in the South 
African Income Tax Act (ITA),46 and neither is the term "taxable year". The 
court in ITC 1878 accepted without explanation that the "fiscal year" of the 
taxpayer, a non-resident company, ran from 1 March to 28 February.47 This, 
of course, is the "year of assessment" for individuals, but not necessarily 
                                            
41  Avery Jones et al 1984 BTR (II) 94 and Avery Jones 2017 BTR 396. 
42  ITC 1878 2015 77 SATC 349. 
43  Article 5(2)(k) of the 1997 South Africa-US DTA (emphasis added), quoted at ITC 
1878 2015 77 SATC 349 para [12]. 
44  The court in this case considered the Commentary pertaining to art 15 of the OECD 
MTC. 
45  OECD 1991 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264239081-102-en para 21. Also see 
Pötgens Income from International Private Employment 563; Arnold 2008 BFIT 224.  
46  Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (ITA). 
47  ITC 1878 2015 77 SATC 349 para [47], where the court referred to this period as the 
"tax year". 
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companies.48 As pointed out above, the court did not refer to the general 
renvoi clause, but it is nevertheless noteworthy that the court used a 
domestic meaning for a different term ("year of assessment") to give 
meaning to the treaty term ("taxable year"). 
Considered below are three judgments in which a South African court was 
tasked with the interpretation of a DTA and the court expressly referred to 
the general renvoi clause in that DTA.  
3.1 ITC 789 
ITC 78949 concerned non-resident shareholders' tax (NRST) levied under 
1941 income tax legislation of the Union of South Africa (1941 ITA).50 The 
South Africa-United Kingdom (UK) DTA, signed in October 1946, included 
the following exemption from NRST:51 
There shall be exempt from the Union non-resident shareholders' tax – (a) any 
amount in respect of which the person chargeable with such tax is a company, 
if the amount so chargeable represents the whole or a portion of the taxable 
income of a private company which, under the law of the Union relating to the 
taxation of the income of private companies, is apportionable … to a public 
company which is a resident of the United Kingdom.  
The case concerned a private company that had a portion of its taxable 
income apportioned "under the law of the Union" to its UK shareholder. The 
court in ITC 789 had to determine whether the UK shareholder qualified as 
a "public company" for the purposes of the above-mentioned exemption 
under the DTA.  
The term "public company" was defined in the 1941 ITA.52 The parties and 
the court accepted that the term in the treaty would have the meaning set 
out in this definition and the court noted that this was "placed beyond doubt" 
by the general renvoi clause in the 1946 South Africa-UK DTA.53 The court 
held that the UK resident company did not meet that definition in the 1941 
ITA and that the exemption in the DTA accordingly did not apply.54 
At first glance, the judgment in ITC 789 does not add much to an 
understanding of the interpretative issues surrounding general renvoi 
                                            
48  See the definitions of "financial year" and "year of assessment" in s 1 of the ITA, 
read with s 5(1)(c) and (d). 
49  ITC 789 1954 19 SATC 434 (ITC 789). 
50  Income Tax Act 31 of 1941 (the 1941 ITA). 
51  Article VI(1)(a) of the 1946 South Africa-UK DTA (emphasis added), quoted at ITC 
789 436-437. 
52  Section 33(2) of the 1941 ITA. 
53  ITC 789 437. Also see Baldwins (South Africa) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue 1961 24 SATC 270 281. The general renvoi clause was art II(3) of the 1946 
South Africa-UK DTA. 
54  ITC 789 441. 
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clauses highlighted in part 2. However, it may be of some interest to the 
issue identified in part 2.1, that is whether the ambulatory or statutory 
approach should be followed in respect of general renvoi clauses based on 
the pre-1995 version of article 3(2). The general renvoi clause considered 
in ITC 789 was such a clause. In this regard, it is noteworthy that certain 
provisions of the 1941 ITA relating to the taxation of the income of private 
companies were changed after the conclusion of the 1946 South Africa-UK 
DTA. As noted above, the NRST exemption in the DTA applied in respect 
of55   
any amount … which, under the law of the Union relating to the taxation of 
income of private companies, is apportionable … to a public company.  
This provision thus did not expressly state whether, for the purposes of this 
exemption, the law pertaining to the taxation of the income of private 
companies applied as at the conclusion of the DTA, or as at the application 
of the DTA. The taxpayer conceded that56  
'the law of the Union relating to the taxation of the income of private 
companies' includes any alteration of that law introduced subsequent to the 
date of the [DTA].  
The court expressly agreed with this view.57  
The phrase "under the law of the Union relating to" in this exemption from 
NRST is comparable with the phrase in the general renvoi clause in the 
DTA, which stated that undefined terms in the DTA should have the 
meaning "under the laws of that Contracting Government relating to the 
taxes".58 It is not surprising that the exemption from NRST should mirror any 
changes in the domestic tax law with regard to the manner of calculating the 
amounts subject to NRST. One thus cannot infer from this alone that the 
general renvoi clause would have been interpreted in the same ambulatory 
manner. The correlation in the wording of the NRST exemption and the 
general renvoi clause is nevertheless noteworthy and the court's approach 
at least indirectly shows that it was not averse to adopting an ambulatory 
approach.  
                                            
55  Emphasis added. 
56  ITC 789 437. 
57  ITC 789 437. 
58  The relevant part of the 1963 version of art 3(2) of the OECD MTC reads as follows: 
"which it has under the laws of that Contracting State relating to the taxes" (emphasis 
added). In the 1977 version this phrase was amended, and it has since read as 
follows: "which it has under the law of that State concerning the taxes" (emphasis 
added). According to Avery Jones et al 1984 BTR (I) 19 the change from "relating" 
to "concerning" in the English text of the OECD MTC is unlikely to signify a change 
in meaning. 
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3.2 Baldwins (South Africa) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 
The decision by the Appellate Division (AD) in Baldwins (South Africa) Ltd 
v Commissioner for Inland Revenue (Baldwins)59 also dealt with the NRST 
exemption in the 1946 South Africa-UK DTA. As in ITC 789,60 the AD had 
to decide whether a UK company which was the sole shareholder of the 
South African taxpayer company was a "public company" for the purposes 
of the NRST exemption in the DTA. One of the issues considered by the 
court was whether the definition of "public company" in the 1941 ITA could 
be used to give meaning to the term in the DTA. The taxpayer pointed out 
that this definition included categories of companies that could apply only to 
local and not to foreign companies, and argued that this was an indication 
that it was not the intention of the contracting states that the definition in the 
1941 ITA would apply to the NRST exemption in the DTA.61 The taxpayer 
further argued that the meaning of the treaty term "public company" should 
instead derive from the company laws of either the Union of South Africa62 
or the UK. According to the taxpayer, this would have resulted in the 
taxpayer's UK parent company qualifying as a "public company".63  
The AD disagreed with this argument and noted as follows:64 
I can find nothing …which shows clearly that the term 'public company' cannot 
have the meaning which has been assigned to it in …. our Income Tax Act…. 
On the contrary there is at least one very good reason why no other meaning 
should be assigned to it, and that is that otherwise the legislature of the United 
Kingdom could, by altering its definition of 'public company', alter the incidence 
of a Union tax in the Union. Such a possibility could never have entered the 
minds of the two contracting Governments.  
Some scholars argue that this statement in Baldwins supports the static 
approach discussed in part 2.1.65 When evaluating this argument it is 
                                            
59  Baldwins (South Africa) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1961 24 SATC 270 
(Baldwins). 
60  The AD referred to ITC 789 at Baldwins 281. 
61  Baldwins 272. 
62  It should be pointed out that the general renvoi clause in the 1946 SA-UK DTA did 
not include the phrase "any meaning under the applicable tax laws of that State 
prevailing over a meaning given to the term under other laws of that State". This 
phrase was added to art 3(2) of the OECD MTC only in 1995. The court in Baldwins 
did not expressly consider the meaning of the word "public company" in the Union's 
company laws and did not explain why it refrained from doing so.  
63  Baldwins 273, 281. As mentioned in the previous footnote, the meaning under the 
company laws of the Union of South Africa was not considered in the judgment. 
64  Baldwins 281 (emphasis added). 
65  Du Toit and Hattingh "Beneficial Ownership" para 9.11 n 175. In support of their 
argument they note as follows: "The Appellate Division refused to apply an amended 
domestic definition of the term in the United Kingdom since this domestic definition 
postdated the conclusion of the convention and, if followed through in the 
convention, would allow the United Kingdom the opportunity to unilaterally alter the 
allocation of tax relief from a South African tax under the convention." Avery Jones 
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important to note that there is no mention in the reported judgment of any 
actual amendment of either the definition of "public company" in the 1941 
ITA or the meaning of "public company" in UK company law in the period 
after the conclusion of the 1946 DTA and leading up to the years of 
assessment considered in Baldwins. The statement of the court was thus 
not made in the context of deciding which of two possible meanings, one 
existing at the time of the conclusion of the DTA and an amended one 
existing at the time of the application of the DTA, should be used for the 
purpose of the DTA's general renvoi clause. Furthermore, it seems that the 
concern of the AD was aimed mainly at the possibility that, if a domestic 
meaning from UK law were to be used (as proposed by the taxpayer), the 
UK could, by amending its legislation, force South Africa to give an 
exemption from a tax levied by South Africa. There is no indication that the 
AD would have been equally concerned had South Africa amended its own 
legislation to extend the circumstances under which it would give exemption 
from NRST. It thus seems that Baldwins does not add to the debate on the 
static versus ambulatory approach.  
Turning to the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires", the AD in 
Baldwins referred to a judgment of the Privy Council where that court held 
as follows:66 
Now, when the interpretation clause in a statute says that such and such an 
expression shall include so and so, a court in construing a statute is bound to 
give effect to the direction unless it can be shown that the context of the 
particular passage where the expression is used shows clearly that the 
meaning is not in this place to be given effect to, or unless there can be alleged 
some general reason of weight why the interpretation clause is to be denied 
its application. 
The court in Baldwins indicated that it would thus depart from the domestic 
meaning of "public company" in the 1941 ITA only if the context "clearly" 
showed otherwise, or if there were some other reasons "of weight".67 Also, 
it was pointed out earlier that Avery Jones argues that the reasons required 
to overthrow a definition of a term under article 3(1) (which also includes the 
phrase "unless the context otherwise requires") might have to be stronger 
than those required to overthrow a domestic meaning under article 3(2). If 
one takes this argument further, the reasons will have to be stronger to 
overthrow a statutory definition in domestic legislation when interpreting that 
legislation68 than a domestic meaning under article 3(2) when interpreting a 
                                            
"Treaty Interpretation" para 4.8.2 notes that the AD in this case "declined to apply 
later domestic law in the other state". 
66  Govindasamy v Indian Immigration Trust Board Natal 1918 AD 633, quoted at 
Baldwins 281. Emphasis added. 
67  Baldwins 280-281. 
68  It is common for South African legislation when defining terms to include the phrase 
"unless the context otherwise requires", or a comparable one. S 1 of the ITA, for 
E JANSEN VAN RENSBURG  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  15 
DTA. Amongst other considerations, one should bear in mind that only one 
legislature is involved in making domestic law as opposed to two in respect 
of DTAs.69 However, in Baldwins the court made no such distinction. 
Arguably, the court therefore required an equally strong indication that the 
context required otherwise in the case of both these instruments. 
3.3 Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v 
Tradehold  
3.3.1 Background  
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold 
(Tradehold)70 concerned the imposition of an "immediate exit tax". An exit 
tax is a tax that is levied due to the fact that a person has left the tax 
jurisdiction of a state; that is, upon "tax emigration".71 In the case of an 
immediate exit tax, the taxable amount is calculated with reference to the 
value of the emigrating taxpayer's assets at the point in time immediately 
prior to the tax emigration.72 The tax is levied even though no actual transfer 
of assets took place and there is thus no realised gain at that stage.  
The taxpayer in Tradehold was a South African incorporated company that 
relocated its "place of effective management" from South Africa to 
Luxembourg. According to Gutuza,73 the taxpayer thus became 
simultaneously tax resident in both South Africa and Luxembourg under 
each state's domestic tax laws. It was tax resident in Luxembourg only for 
the purposes of the South Africa-Luxembourg DTA, however.74  
Shortly thereafter, an amendment to the definition of "resident" in the ITA 
resulted in the fact that the taxpayer ceased to be a tax resident of South 
                                            
example, includes the phrase "unless the context otherwise indicates". For more 
recent case law on when a South African court will depart from a definition in 
domestic legislation see, for example, Canca v Mount Frere Municipality 1984 2 SA 
830 (Tk) 832; SATAWU v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) para 134; and Minister of 
Mineral Resources v Sishen Iron Ore Co (Pty) Ltd 2014 2 SA 603 (CC) para [59]. 
Regarding the meaning of the word "require" in different contexts, see Clutchco (Pty) 
Ltd v Davis 2005 3 SA 486 (SCA) paras [11]-[12]. 
69  As Arnold 2010 BFIT 10 notes, "it is more difficult to determine the intentions of the 
two parties to a treaty than the intention of a single legislature". 
70  Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd 2012 3 All SA 
15 (SCA) (Tradehold). 
71  Chand 2013 BFIT heading 1. Under the ITA, the exit tax is not a separate tax. It 
refers to an amount that is taken into account when calculating a person's "taxable 
income" in respect of which normal tax is levied.  
72  Chand 2013 BFIT heading 2.1.1. 
73  Gutuza 2016 SA Merc LJ 492-493. Also see Anonymous 2012 Taxpayer 95. 
74  This was due to the application of the tie-breaker clause in art 4(3) of the South 
Africa-Luxembourg DTA. The DTA was entered into between South Africa and the 
Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg on 6 December 2000. 
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Africa for the purposes of the ITA too.75 The Commissioner argued that at 
this stage a deeming provision in the Eighth Schedule to the ITA triggered 
the imposition of the exit tax.76 Under this deeming provision,77 the taxpayer 
was "treated … as having disposed" of its only relevant asset, its 
shareholding in a subsidiary company. 
In response to the Commissioner's argument, the taxpayer argued that 
South Africa was prevented from levying the exit tax under a provision in 
the South Africa-Luxembourg DTA that is based on the current article 13(5) 
of the OECD MTC.78 This provision gave the contracting state in which the 
alienator was resident (Luxembourg, in the case of Tradehold)79 the 
exclusive taxing right in respect of the "alienation" of assets consisting of 
shares.  
To counter this argument, the Commissioner contended that the tax 
emigration that triggered the exit tax was not an "alienation" as 
contemplated under the DTA and that the DTA thus did not restrict South 
Africa's right to levy the exit tax.80 The SCA was accordingly left with the 
task of giving meaning to the word "alienation" in the South Africa-
Luxembourg DTA. The word "alienation" is used in article 13 of the OECD 
MTC to indicate the event that gives rise to the gains covered by each of its 
sub-paragraphs.81 The most common dictionary meaning for the word 
                                            
75  Definition of "resident" in s 1 of the ITA. 
76  The Commissioner argued that the immediate exit tax was triggered either when the 
taxpayer relocated its place of effective management to Luxembourg, or when it 
ceased to be a resident of South Africa. Tradehold para 4. 
77  At the time of the judgment in Tradehold, this deeming provision was found in para 
12(1) and (2)(a) of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA. It has since been removed from 
the Eighth Schedule and replaced by a new s 9H in the main ITA.  
78  Article 13(4) of the South Africa-Luxembourg DTA. 
79  Arnold 2012 BFIT 484 explains that, on the assumption that tax emigration may be 
regarded as an "alienation" in terms of art 13 of the OECD MTC, states often deem 
in their domestic tax law that the alienation takes place immediately prior to the tax 
emigration. If this deeming is effective, it results in the taxation event happening at a 
time when the taxpayer is still resident in the state from which the emigration took 
place. This would give that state the right to levy an exit tax under the DTA. At the 
time of the application of the South Africa-Luxembourg DTA in Tradehold, the ITA 
also contained such a timing provision in para 13(1)(g) of the Eighth Schedule. 
However, in Tradehold this deeming provision did not have the result referred to by 
Arnold and much speculation ensued amongst scholars as to why this might have 
been the case. See in this regard Mazansky 2012 BFIT 375; Arnold 2012 BFIT 484; 
Classen 2013 SA Merc LJ 395-397; Gutuza 2014 SA Merc LJ 552. According to 
Anonymous 2012 Taxpayer 91, 95, it has to do with the rather unique factual 
circumstances of the case, including the change in legislation described earlier in 
the main text.  
80  Other arguments were also advanced by the Commissioner. See in this regard 
Tradehold para [14]. 
81  Simontacchi Taxation of Capital Gains 175. 
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"alienation" is "the transfer of ownership".82 However, states often include 
in their domestic tax legislation a definition for the term "alienation", or a 
definition of a different but comparable term,83 and this definition frequently 
gives the term a meaning that includes events that do not involve a transfer 
of ownership.84  
All of the above also holds true for the Eighth Schedule to the ITA. This is 
the part of the ITA in terms of which provisions relevant to the exit tax, 
forming part of the capital gains tax (CGT),85 were included at the time that 
the South Africa-Luxembourg DTA was applied. Under this part, the trigger 
event for the levying of CGT is the "disposal" of an asset, rather than its 
"alienation". The term "disposal" is defined in general terms to include an 
"event … which results in the … transfer … of an asset".86 Certain specific 
events are also expressly included, such as the "sale … or any other 
alienation or transfer of ownership" of an asset.87 In addition to this general 
definition of a "disposal", a number of events are "treated" as disposals.88 
At the time of the application of the South Africa-Luxembourg DTA, tax 
emigration was one such event.  
The question considered in Tradehold was thus whether tax emigration, 
which involves no actual transfer of assets, can be regarded as an 
"alienation" for the purposes of a provision in a DTA based on the current 
article 13(5) of the OECD. This question had been considered prior to 
Tradehold by foreign courts. The Dutch Hoge Raad, for example,89 had 
considered it in respect of a Dutch exit tax on substantial shareholding.90 In 
terms of the relevant Dutch tax legislation, tax emigration from the 
Netherlands was deemed a "vervreemding" and triggered the imposition of 
the Dutch exit tax.91 The Hoge Raad had to consider provisions in three 
                                            
82  Simontacchi Taxation of Capital Gains 175. Also see the dictionary meaning of 
"alienation" mentioned at Tradehold para [13]. 
83  Simontacchi Taxation of Capital Gains 180. 
84  Simontacchi Taxation of Capital Gains 178-179. 
85  See n 71 above, which also pertains to "capital gains tax". 
86  The definition of "disposal" in para 1, read with para 11(1), of the Eighth Schedule to 
the ITA. 
87  Paragraph 11(1)(a) of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA (emphasis added). To 
complete the definition of a "disposal", para 11(2) of the Eighth Schedule lists a 
number of events that do not constitute a "disposal". 
88  Paragraph 12 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA.  
89  Apart from the example mentioned in the main text, see the Canadian case law 
discussed by Kandev 2007 Can Tax J 57-58 and the German case law referred to 
by Chand 2013 BFIT n 145. 
90  Decision by the Hoge Raad (20 February 2009) 42701 BNB 2009/260; Decision by 
the Hoge Raad (20 February 2009) 43760 BNB 2009/261; Decision by the Hoge 
Raad (20 February 2009) 07/12314 BNB 2009/262. Also see the discussion of these 
cases by De Pietro 2015 World Tax J 83.  
91  Section 4.16 of the Wet op de inkomstenbelasting 2001 is introduced by the title 
"Fictieve vervreemdingen". The section states: "Onder vervreemding van aandelen 
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Dutch DTAs, each based on the current article 13(5) of the OECD MTC.92 
The court was primarily concerned with the question whether the levying of 
the exit tax, which had been introduced after the conclusion of the 
respective DTAs, constituted treaty override. However, the court referred to 
the general renvoi clauses included in these DTAs and held that the deemed 
vervreemding constituted an "alienation" under the treaties.93  
Scholars, too, have considered whether tax emigration that triggers an exit 
tax can constitute an "alienation" for the purposes of article 13. Some 
scholars support this possibility. They contend that the treaty term 
"alienation" has a wide, autonomous meaning that includes tax emigration. 
Alternatively (or additionally) they contend that this outcome is achieved by 
referring to the domestic meaning of the term as provided for in the general 
renvoi clause.94 These scholars also argue that the Commentary pertaining 
to article 13 supports their view.95 There are, however, authors that argue 
against this possibility.96  
                                            
of winstbewijzen wordt mede verstaan…(h) het anders dan door overlijden 
ophouden binnenlands belastingplichtige te zijn, hieronder begrepen de situatie 
waarin de belastingplichtige voor de toepassing van de Belastingregeling voor het 
Koninkrijk, de Belastingregeling voor het land Nederland of een verdrag ter 
voorkoming van dubbele belasting wordt geacht geen inwoner van Nederland meer 
te zijn." For a summary of the main elements of the Dutch exit tax on substantial 
shareholding, see Chand 2013 BFIT heading 2.1.4. 
92  At the time of entering into these DTAs, art 13(4) of the OECD MTC was the 
comparable provision. 
93  As summarised by De Pietro 2015 World Tax J 83-84.  
94  Simontacchi Taxation of Capital Gains 184, 191 and 196 argues that the treaty term 
"alienation" should be interpreted as having a wide meaning that could include tax 
emigration, but that recourse to art 3(2) may at times be needed. Arnold 2012 BFIT 
483 also argues in favour of the use of art 3(2). 
95  The passages most often relied on are paras 7-9 and para 10. In respect of paras 7-
9 of the Commentary, see the conclusie by Advocate General Wattel to the Decision 
by the Hoge Raad (20 February 2009) 42701 BNB 2009/260 paras 4.13 and 4.43; 
Simontacchi Taxation of Capital Gains 186-187; Arnold 2012 BFIT 483 (who refers 
to paras 5-8); Chand 2013 BFIT heading 4.3.1; Mooij 2019 BTR 25 (who refers to 
para 8). In respect of para 10 of the Commentary, see Simontacchi Taxation of 
Capital Gains 192-193; Brilman 2015 BFIT 446. 
96  De Broe "Tax Treatment of Transfer of Residence by Individuals" 65 argues that 
"§§6–10 of the OECD commentary on article 13 OECD model do not support the 
view that countries are entitled to tax unrealized gains that accrued prior to 
emigration". Arnold 2012 BFIT n 13 also notes: "M. Lang, Introduction to the Law of 
Double Taxation Conventions pp. 100-101 (Linde 2010) takes the view that 
'alienation' should have a treaty meaning independent of domestic law and therefore, 
deemed dispositions under domestic law are not necessarily alienations under a tax 
treaty." Also see the other sources mentioned by Chand 2013 BFIT n 138. 
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3.3.2 The court's finding on the application of the general renvoi clause 
The tax court97 in the Tradehold matter held that the deemed disposal 
constituted an "alienation" under the DTA. It never mentioned the general 
renvoi clause in the South Africa-Luxembourg DTA, but stated as follows:98 
I am unable to see any reason why a deemed disposal of property should not 
be treated as an alienation of property for purposes of … the DTA. I agree in 
this regard with counsel for the appellant, who argued that it would be absurd 
if a taxpayer were to be protected in terms of … [the DTA] from liability for tax 
resulting from a gain from an actual alienation of property, but not from a 
deemed alienation of property. 
On appeal, the SCA referred to two arguments advanced by the 
Commissioner in averring that no "alienation" as contemplated in the DTA 
had taken place.99 The first argument was that, since tax emigration is a 
deemed disposal under the South African ITA, it cannot be regarded as an 
actual disposal and thus also not as an "alienation" under the DTA. The 
Commissioner's second argument was that "alienation" should have the 
meaning that it (and not the term "disposal") would have under South African 
non-tax law, bearing in mind that the word "alienation" itself is not defined 
in the ITA;100 in this context, "alienation" does not include tax emigration.101 
                                            
97  ITC 1848 2010 73 SATC 170. 
98  ITC 1848 2010 73 SATC 170 paras [14] and [15]. These, and the next paragraph of 
the judgment, were quoted by the SCA in its judgment at para [10]. 
99  Tradehold paras [11]-[13]. 
100  As pointed out in n 62 above, in some cases where an undefined treaty term is 
interpreted there may be conflicting domestic meanings. This gives rise to 
uncertainty as to how the appropriate domestic meaning should be determined 
(although, after 1995, art 3(2) deals with this potential issue more explicitly). In other 
cases there may not be a domestic meaning at all in the tax legislation (or in the part 
of the tax legislation relating to the levying of the tax that is restricted under the DTA), 
but there may be a meaning in other areas of the domestic (tax) law. The question 
is whether art 3(2) can be applied in these cases. Both these issues are considered 
by Kandev 2007 Can Tax J, Rust "Article 3(2) OECD and UN MC" 207-208 m.nr. 
112 and Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 4.4. There is, however, no 
indication that the SCA in Tradehold was troubled by these issues, since it only 
briefly mentioned at para [13] the Commissioner's contention that "alienation" should 
have the meaning that it has in the context of insolvency law, discussed in the next 
footnote. 
101  There is case law on the meaning of the term "alienation" in the context of South 
African insolvency legislation. The court in Cronje v Paul Els Investments (Pty) Ltd 
1982 2 SA 179 (T) 188 defined it as "die handeling waardeur eiendomsreg oorgedra 
word". This meaning was, in turn, based on an earlier decision by the AD in Grobler 
v Trustee Estate De Beer 1915 AD 265, where too insolvency legislation was 
considered. This meaning thus corresponds with the dictionary meaning of the word 
mentioned in the main text corresponding to n 82, that is, "the transfer of ownership". 
There are also South African non-tax statutes that contain definitions for "alienate" 
and "alienation" respectively. Examples include the definitions for "alienate", with 
"alienation" having a "corresponding meaning", in s 1(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 
68 of 1981 and s 1 of the Property Time-Sharing Control Act 75 of 1983. The Housing 
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The court rejected the Commissioner's argument and held that South Africa 
was prohibited from imposing the exit tax in these circumstances under the 
DTA.102 In order to analyse the judgment of the SCA in the  light of the issues 
raised in part 2 of this article, one must first determine which of the following 
two alternatives played out in the SCA's judgement: the SCA gave the treaty 
term "alienation" the meaning that it (or a comparable term) has in South 
African domestic law under the general renvoi clause included in the South 
Africa-Luxembourg DTA; alternatively, the SCA gave the treaty term 
"alienation" an autonomous meaning that includes tax emigration. Which of 
these alternatives is the more likely one is discussed next by analysing 
various statements made by the SCA and scholars' understanding of the 
SCA's judgement. 
The first statement of the SCA worth noting is the following statement:103 
The [South Africa-Luxembourg] DTA is based upon the [OECD MTC], which 
has served as the basis for similar agreements that exist between many 
countries. In interpreting its provisions, one must therefore not expect to 
find an exact correlation between the wording in the DTA and that used in 
the domestic taxing statute… [ I ]nevitably the wording in the DTA cannot 
be expected to match precisely that used in the domestic taxing statute. In 
SIR v Downing (supra) Corbett JA remarked … 'The convention makes 
liberal use of what has been termed "international tax language" (see 
Ostime …)' … . Sub-article 2 [of article 3] provides for a general rule of 
interpretation for terms used in the DTA that are not defined. 'Alienation' 
is not one of the defined terms and thus article 3(2) finds application … 
In a later statement, the SCA held as follows:104 
The crisp question that falls to be determined is whether the term ‘alienation’ 
as used in the DTA includes within its ambit gains arising from a deemed (as 
opposed to actual) disposal of assets. As mentioned above105 the term must 
be given a meaning that is congruent with the language of the DTA having 
regard to its object and purpose. 
Classen argues that the court "relied heavily" on article 3(2),106 which 
presumably means that her view is that the court gave a domestic meaning 
to the treaty term "alienation". Du Plessis, however, favours the view that a 
domestic meaning was not given to the treaty term. She argues that the 
court by implication held that the context required that a domestic meaning 
                                            
Development Schemes for Retired Persons Act 65 of 1988 has a definition for 
"alienate" in s 1. None of these statutes was mentioned in Tradehold. 
102  Tradehold para [25]. 
103  Tradehold paras [18]-[19] (emphasis added). 
104  Tradehold para [23] (emphasis added).  
105  Tradehold para [21]. 
106  Classen 2013 SA Merc LJ 398-399. She argues, however, that the facts perhaps 
warranted that the context required an alternative interpretation. 
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not be used107 and that the SCA gave the treaty term an autonomous 
meaning that includes tax emigration. In support of her view, she points out 
that the SCA referred to the use of "international tax language" in DTAs in 
the passage quoted above.108  
With regard to the phrase "international tax language", Prokisch explains 
that it refers to the "common international understanding" of a treaty term. 
He further argues that, by using this term in a DTA, the contracting parties 
to that DTA intend for the term to have that meaning,109 
unless they prefer to give the term a special meaning, either by formulating a 
special definition of the term or by using a term which has a clear relation to 
domestic law.  
Prokisch's explanation opens up a number of possibilities relating to the 
motivation for including a widely-used term in a DTA. Two of these are 
relevant here. The first is that the contracting parties elected that treaty term 
in order to convey that the "common international understanding" for that 
term should apply to their DTA. The second possibility is that the treaty term 
has "a clear relation" to a term used in the domestic law of either or both of 
the treaty parties and the parties intended for the treaty term to have the 
meaning that the term has in their domestic laws. 
What did the court in Tradehold have in mind with its reference to 
"international tax language"? One should note that the court referred to the 
phrase immediately after its statement that one cannot expect the words 
used in DTAs to perfectly match those used in domestic tax legislation. 
Arguably, the court may have been advocating the second possibility raised 
by Prokisch and felt it necessary to explain that a treaty term may have "a 
clear relation" not only to an identical term used in the domestic law,110 but 
also to a different, comparable term. Therefore, when determining the 
domestic meaning of a treaty term under the general renvoi clause (to which 
the court referred in its statement in the following paragraph), it is not 
                                            
107  Du Plessis South African Perspective on Some Critical Issues 134-135. However, 
she includes at n 958 the possibility that the court used a domestic meaning. 
108  Du Plessis South African Perspective on Some Critical Issues 135. Also see Seiler 
2013 BFIT 581.  
109  Quoted in Du Toit Beneficial Ownership of Royalties 182. The expression 
"international tax language" is usually attributed to the UK case of Ostime (Inspector 
of Taxes) v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1960] AC 459. In that case, the 
court stated at 480 that the particular DTA employed "language … [t]hat may be 
called international tax language, and that such categories [as some of the terms 
being interpreted] have no exact counterpart in the taxing code of the United 
Kingdom." (emphasis added) 
110  As noted in n 114 below, the definition of "disposal" did not yet form part of the ITA 
when the DTA was negotiated. However, as mentioned in the main text 
corresponding to n 83, a definition of "alienation" or a comparable term is a common 
and thus anticipated feature in CGT legislation.  
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surprising that the treaty and domestic laws may use different terms for the 
same concept. 
The view preferred in this article is that the court's initial reference to the 
general renvoi clause is an indication that the court considered the domestic 
meaning of the treaty term as its starting point. As shown in the highlighted 
sentence in the last paragraph quoted earlier, it then also considered 
whether the adoption of that meaning would be supported by the "context", 
which would arguably include the purpose of the DTA.111 It probably found 
that it would be supported. Otherwise, one would have expected it to consult 
possible aids to the determining of an alternative, autonomous meaning. 
These aids could have included foreign case law, writings of foreign 
scholars, or the Commentaries.112 As shown earlier, there is at least some 
guidance from these sources on the meaning of the treaty term "alienation" 
in the context of tax emigration. 
The SCA concluded as follows, with the highlighted sentence possibly 
confirming the use of the domestic meaning of "disposal" under the general 
renvoi clause:113 
[24] Article 13 is widely cast… It is reasonable to suppose that the parties to 
the DTA were aware of the provisions of the Eighth Schedule114 and must 
have intended article 13 to apply to capital gains of the kind provided in the 
Schedule ... There is, moreover, no reason in principle why the parties to the 
DTA would have intended that article 13 should apply only to taxes on actual 
capital gains resulting from actual alienations of property. 
[25] Having regard to the factors mentioned, I am of the view that the term 
"alienation" as it is used in the DTA is not restricted to actual alienation. It is a 
neutral term having a broader meaning, comprehending both actual and 
deemed disposals of assets giving rise to taxable capital gains. 
                                            
111  Van der Bruggen 2003 Euro Tax 147 and 153. 
112  The place of the Commentaries under the VCLT has been the subject of debate. For 
a summary of some of the sources that deal with this debate, see Du Plessis South 
African Perspective on Some Critical Issues 100. There is also a question on whether 
the Commentaries can be taken into account as "context" under art 3(2) of the OECD 
MTC, in respect of which see the discussion by Rust "Article 3(2) OECD and UN 
MC" 212 m.nr. 123 and Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" para 5.1.1. However, 
there is no indication that the court in Tradehold refrained from referring to the 
Commentaries due to either of these debates.  
113  Tradehold paras [24]-[25]. 
114  This is a somewhat surprising statement since the announcement of the introduction 
of CGT in the budget speech of 23 February 2000 post-dates the signature of the 
South Africa-Luxembourg DTA. The Eighth Schedule was inserted by way of 
legislation (s 38 of the Taxation Laws Amendment Act 5 of 2001) only after the DTA 
was already in force. Also see Seiler 2013 BFIT 580. 
E JANSEN VAN RENSBURG  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  23 
3.3.3 The implications of the judgment for the issues considered in this 
article 
Assuming that the SCA in Tradehold did indeed give the domestic meaning 
of "disposal" to the treaty term "alienation" under the general renvoi clause 
in the applicable DTA, what deductions can one make with regard to the 
issues discussed in part 2?  
With regard to the issue highlighted in part 2.2, the SCA in Tradehold was 
prepared to give to a treaty term ("alienation" in this case) the meaning that 
a different expression ("disposal" in this case) bears in domestic legislation 
with reference to the general renvoi clause in the applicable DTA. It thus 
supports the view that the meaning of a different but comparable expression 
in the domestic law may in appropriate circumstances be taken into account 
under the general renvoi clause.  
Furthermore, with regard to the question raised in part 2.3, that is whether 
deeming provisions in the domestic law may be taken into account under 
the general renvoi clause, the SCA's judgement supports such a 
possibility.115  
With regard to both these conclusions, the court emphasised the need to 
take into account the context, including the purpose of the DTA, when 
considering whether a domestic meaning should be used. 
Lastly, with regard to the issue identified in part 2.4, that is whether a 
domestic meaning under article 3(2) should be used either "as a last resort", 
or as a matter of strong preference, the judgment does not make a clear 
impact. One can possibly say that the court accepted at the outset that a 
domestic meaning would apply and that it was looking for a reason why this 
should not be the case. This might thus indicate a preference for the 
domestic meaning. However, how "strong" the reasons for departing from 
this meaning should be is not apparent from the SCA's judgment. 
4 Conclusion 
General renvoi clauses in DTAs based on article 3(2) of the OECD MTC 
provide that an undefined term in a DTA shall have the meaning that it has 
in the domestic law of the contracting state applying the DTA unless the 
                                            
115  However, note the following warning by Lewison LJ in his minority judgment in 
Fowler v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs [2018] EWCA 
Civ 2544 para [22]: "But I cannot extract from [Tradehold] the general proposition 
that a word used in a double tax treaty to describe a particular source of income or 
gain necessarily encompasses a domestic deeming provision, particularly where the 
word in question is defined in domestic tax law (which 'alienation' was not)." 
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context otherwise requires.116 There are many issues pertaining to the 
application and interpretation of these clauses, only four of which are 
considered in this article. 
The first issue arises in those scenarios where a domestic meaning was 
amended after the conclusion of the relevant DTA. The question is then 
whether an ambulatory or static approach should be preferred. Since the 
redrafting of article 3(2) in 1995, it clearly prescribes the ambulatory 
approach. Accordingly, the domestic meaning at the time of the application 
of the DTA is the relevant meaning. With regard to clauses in DTAs based 
on the pre-1995 version of article 3(2), the position is less clear. Arguably, 
this issue has not yet been directly addressed by South African courts, and 
also not by the AD in Baldwins. However, some comments in ITC 789 may 
indirectly support the adoption of the ambulatory approach. 
The second issue arises in those scenarios where the domestic law uses 
an expression that differs from the term used in the DTA. The question to 
be considered is whether the domestic meaning of the different but 
comparable expression in the domestic law may be taken into account 
under the general renvoi clause. The decision of the SCA in Tradehold 
arguably supports this possibility. The court in ITC 1878 did not refer to the 
general renvoi clause, but it is noteworthy that it used the meaning of a 
different expression in the ITA when it interpreted an undefined term in a 
South African DTA. 
Another issue concerns deeming provisions in domestic law. In particular, 
the issue is whether these deeming provisions pertaining to the domestic 
meaning of a term may under general renvoi clauses be taken into account 
when an undefined term in the applicable DTA is interpreted. Again, the 
decision in Tradehold supports this possibility. 
The fourth issue considers whether a domestic meaning may under article 
3(2) be applied only "as a last resort", or whether on the contrary it will apply 
unless there are "reasonably strong arguments" that the context requires 
otherwise. In Baldwins the AD showed a strong preference for the use of a 
domestic meaning under a general renvoi clause, indicating that it would 
depart from it only if the context "clearly" showed otherwise, or if there were 
some other reasons "of weight". The more recent judgment in Tradehold is 
not as clear in its expressed preference for the use of a domestic meaning.  
The combined picture that emerges from these judgments over a 60-year 
period is that South African courts do not regard the use of domestic 
meanings under article 3(2) "as a last resort". They have instead been 
willing to use domestic meanings whilst noting the lack of weighty reasons 
                                            
116  Or unless the competent authorities agree to a different meaning pursuant to the 
provisions of art 25. 
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to the contrary. They were moreover prepared to do so even in those 
instances where the expression used in the domestic law differed from the 
term used in the DTA and in instances where the meaning in domestic law 
was based on a deeming provision. Possibly, they have also leaned towards 
a preference for the ambulatory approach as a matter of default in those 
cases where a general renvoi clause in a DTA does not expressly prescribe 
whether a static or ambulatory approach should be adopted. 
Bibliography 
Literature 
Anonymous 2012 Taxpayer 
Anonymous "Editorial Note to C: SARS v Tradehold Ltd" 2012 The 
Taxpayer 92-95 
Arnold 2008 BFIT 
Arnold BJ "Time Thresholds in Tax Treaties" 2008 BFIT 218-231 
Arnold 2010 BFIT  
Arnold BJ "The Interpretation of Tax Treaties: Myth and Reality" 2010 BFIT 
1-15 
Arnold 2012 BFIT 
Arnold BJ "International - Tax Treaty Case Law News" 2012 BFIT 481-485 
Avery Jones 2017 BTR 
Avery Jones JF "HMRC v Fowler: More on Divers" 2017 BTR 385-398 
Avery Jones 2019 BTR 
Avery Jones JF "Fowler v HMRC: Divers yet Again" 2019 BTR 22-25 
Avery Jones "Interaction between Tax Treaty Provisions and Domestic Law" 
Avery Jones JF "The Interaction between Tax Treaty Provisions and 
Domestic Law" in Maisto G (ed) Tax Treaties and Domestic Law (IBFD 
Amsterdam 2006) 123-160 
Avery Jones "Treaty Interpretation" 
Avery Jones JF "Treaty Interpretation" in Vann R (ed) Global Tax Treaty 
Commentaries (IBFD Amsterdam 2019)  
Avery Jones and Hattingh 2016 BTR 
Avery Jones and Hattingh "Fowler v HMRC: Divers and the Dangers of 
Deeming" 2016 BTR 417-434 
E JANSEN VAN RENSBURG  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  26 
Avery Jones et al 1984 BTR (I) 
Avery Jones JF et al "The Interpretation of Tax Treaties with Particular 
Reference to Article 3(2) of the OECD Model - I" 1984 BTR 14-54 
Avery Jones et al 1984 BTR (II) 
Avery Jones JF et al "The Interpretation of Tax Treaties with Particular 
Reference to Article 3(2) of the OECD Model - II" 1984 BTR 90-108 
Baker Double Taxation Conventions 
Baker P Double Taxation Conventions (Sweet & Maxwell London 2014) 
Brilman 2015 BFIT  
Brilman L "The Effect of Taxation on Business Mobility in the European 
Union: The Case of the Netherlands" 2015 BFIT 442-449 
Burt 2017 BTCLQ 
Burt K "The OECD Commentaries: On what Legal Basis and to what Extent 
are they Relevant to Tax Treaty Interpretation" 2017 Business Tax & 
Company Law Quarterly 5-28 
Castro 2014 Intertax  
Castro RT "When does 'the Context Otherwise Require' in Article 3 of the 
OECD Model Convention?" 2014 Intertax 709-719 
Chand 2013 BFIT 
Chand V "Exit Charges for Migrating Individuals and Companies: 
Comparative and Tax Treaty Analysis" 2013 BFIT 1-20 
Classen 2013 SA Merc LJ  
Classen LG "The Exit Tax Consequences of the Migration of Companies 
from South Africa: Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v 
Tradehold Ltd: Case Note" 2013 SA Merc LJ 387-403 
De Broe International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse  
De Broe L International Tax Planning and Prevention of Abuse: A Study 
under Domestic Tax Law, Tax Treaties and EC Law in Relation to Conduit 
and Base Companies (IBFD Amsterdam 2007) 
De Broe "Tax Treatment of Transfer of Residence by Individuals" 
De Broe L "The Tax Treatment of Transfer of Residence by Individuals - 
General Report" in IFA Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International Vol 87b (IBFD 
Amsterdam 2002) 19-78 
E JANSEN VAN RENSBURG  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  27 
De Pietro 2015 World Tax J 
De Pietro C "Tax Treaty Override and the Need for Coordination between 
Legal Systems: Safeguarding the Effectiveness of International Law" 2015 
World Tax J 73-97 
Déry and Ward "Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions" 
Déry J and Ward DA "Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions - 
Canada" in IFA Cahiers De Droit Fiscal International Vol 78a (IBFD 
Amsterdam 1993) 259-293 
Du Plessis 2012 SA Merc LJ  
Du Plessis I "Some Thoughts on the Interpretation of Tax Treaties in South 
Africa" 2012 SA Merc LJ 31-52 
Du Plessis 2016 TSAR 
Du Plessis I "The Interpretation of Double Taxation Agreements: A 
Comparative Evaluation of Recent South African Case Law" 2016 TSAR 
484-499 
Du Plessis South African Perspective on Some Critical Issues 
Du Plessis I A South African Perspective on Some Critical Issues Regarding 
the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, with Special 
Emphasis on its Application to Trusts (LLD-dissertation University of 
Stellenbosch 2014) 
Du Toit Beneficial Ownership of Royalties 
Du Toit CP Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in Bilateral Tax Treaties (IBFD 
Amsterdam 1999) 
Du Toit and Hattingh "Beneficial Ownership" 
Du Toit C and Hattingh J "Beneficial Ownership and Double Tax 
Conventions" in De Koker AP and Brincker E (eds) Silke on International 
Tax (LexisNexis Durban 2019) chapter 9  
Edwardes-Ker Tax Treaty Interpretation  
Edwardes-Ker M Tax Treaty Interpretation (PhD-dissertation University of 
London 1994) 
Engelen Interpretation of Tax Treaties 
Engelen FA Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law (IBFD 
Amsterdam 2004) 
E JANSEN VAN RENSBURG  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  28 
Eskinazi "Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions" 
Eskinazi R "Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions - South Africa" 
in IFA Cahiers De Droit Fiscal International Vol 78a (IBFD Amsterdam 1993) 
545-558 
Gutuza 2008 SALJ 
Gutuza T "Taxing the Partner of a Foreign Partnership: Notes" 2008 SALJ 
514-520 
Gutuza 2014 SA Merc LJ  
Gutuza T "Dual Residence and the Proviso: Where was Tradehold 
Resident?" 2014 SA Merc LJ 543-559 
Gutuza 2016 SA Merc LJ 
Gutuza T "Tax Treaties, the Income Tax Act and the Constitution - Trump 
or Reconcile" 2016 SA Merc LJ 480-507 
Hattingh "South Africa"  
Hattingh J "South Africa" in Brauner Y and Pistone P (eds) BRICS and the 
Emergence of International Tax Coordination (IBFD Amsterdam 2015) 231-
270 
Kandev 2007 Can Tax J 
Kandev MN "Tax Treaty Interpretation: Determining Domestic Meaning 
under Article 3(2) of the OECD Model" 2007 Can Tax J 31-71 
Linderfalk and Hilling 2015 Nord Tax J 
Linderfalk U and Hilling M "The Use of OECD Commentaries as 
Interpretative Aids: The Static/Ambulatory-Approaches Debate Considered 
from the Perspective of International Law" 2015 Nord Tax J 34-59 
Mazansky 2012 BFIT 
Mazansky E "South Africa's Exit Charge Overridden by the Luxembourg-
South Africa Income and Capital Tax Treaty (1998)" 2012 BFIT 374-376 
Mooij 2019 BTR 
Mooij H "Fowler v HMRC: An Outside View" 2019 BTR 25-30 
Olivier and Honiball International Tax 
Olivier L and Honiball M International Tax: A South African Perspective 5th 
ed (SiberInk Cape Town 2011) 
E JANSEN VAN RENSBURG  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  29 
Pijl 1997 BFIT 
Pijl H "The Theory of the Interpretation of Tax Treaties, with Reference to 
Dutch Practice" 1997 BFIT 539-546 
Pötgens Income from International Private Employment 
Pötgens F Income from International Private Employment: An Analysis of 
Article 15 of the OECD Model (IBFD Amsterdam 2007) 
Rust "Article 3(2) OECD and UN MC" 
Rust A "Article 3(2) OECD and UN MC" in Reimer E and Rust A (eds) Klaus 
Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions Volume I (Kluwer Law International 
Alphen aan de Rijn 2015) 206-215 
Seiler 2013 BFIT 
Seiler M "Exit Taxation Arising from a Deemed Disposal of Shares" 2013 
BFIT 580-583 
Simontacchi Taxation of Capital Gains 
Simontacchi S Taxation of Capital Gains under the OECD Model 
Convention: With Special Regard to Immovable Property (Kluwer 
International Law Alphen aan den Rijn 2007) 
Van der Bruggen 2003 Euro Tax 
Van der Bruggen E "Unless the Vienna Convention otherwise Requires: 
Notes on the Relationship between Article 3(2) of the OECD Model Tax 
Convention and Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties" 2003 Euro Tax 142-156 
Wattel and Marres 2003a Euro Tax 
Wattel PJ and Marres O "Characterization of Fictitious Income under 
OECD-Patterned Tax Treaties" 2003 Euro Tax 66-79 
Wattel and Marres 2003b Euro Tax 
Wattel PJ and Marres O "The Legal Status of the OECD Commentary and 
Static or Ambulatory Interpretation of Tax Treaties" 2003 Euro Tax 222-235 
Case law 
Canada 
R v Melford Development Inc 82 DTC 6281 
E JANSEN VAN RENSBURG  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  30 
South Africa 
Baldwins (South Africa) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1961 24 
SATC 270 
Canca v Mount Frere Municipality 1984 2 SA 830 (Tk) 
Clutchco (Pty) Ltd v Davis 2005 3 SA 486 (SCA) 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v Tradehold Ltd 2012 
3 All SA 15 (SCA) 
Cronje v Paul Els Investments (Pty) Ltd 1982 2 SA 179 (T) 
Govindasamy v Indian Immigration Trust Board Natal 1918 AD 633 
Grobler v Trustee Estate De Beer 1915 AD 265 
ITC 789 1954 19 SATC 434 
ITC 1848 2010 73 SATC 170 
ITC 1878 2015 77 SATC 349 
Minister of Mineral Resources v Sishen Iron Ore Co (Pty) Ltd 2014 2 SA 
603 (CC) 
SATAWU v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) 
The Netherlands 
Decision by the Hoge Raad (20 February 2009) 42701 BNB 2009/260 
Decision by the Hoge Raad (20 February 2009) 43760 BNB 2009/261 
Decision by the Hoge Raad (20 February 2009) 07/12314 BNB 2009/262 
United Kingdom 
Ostime (Inspector of Taxes) v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1960] 
AC 459 
Fowler v The Commissioners for Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs 
[2018] EWCA Civ 2544 
E JANSEN VAN RENSBURG  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  31 
Legislation 
South Africa 
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Housing Development Schemes for Retired Persons Act 65 of 1988 
Income Tax Act 31 of 1941 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
Property Time-Sharing Control Act 75 of 1983 
Taxation Laws Amendment Act 5 of 2001 
The Netherlands 
Wet op de inkomstenbelasting 2001 
International intruments 
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (latest revision 2017) 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 
Internet sources 
OECD 1991 http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264239081-102-en 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 1991 The 183 
Day Rule: Some Problems of Application and Interpretation 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264239081-102-en accessed 15 December 
2015 
E JANSEN VAN RENSBURG  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  32 
List of Abbreviations 
AD Appellate Division, before being restructured 
as the Supreme Court of Appeal  
BFIT Bulletin for International Taxation 
BTCLQ Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly 
BTR British Tax Review 
Can Tax J Canadian Tax Journal 
CGT Capital gains tax 
DTA Double taxation agreement 
Euro Tax European Taxation 
IBFD International Bureau for Fiscal 
Documentation 
IFA International Fiscal Association 
ITA Income Tax Act 
Nord Tax J Nordic Tax Journal 
NRST Non-resident shareholders' tax 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OECD MTC OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and 
Capital 
SA Merc LJ South African Mercantile Law Journal 
SCA Supreme Court of Appeal 
SALJ South African Law Journal 
TSAR Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
UK United Kingdom 
US United States 
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
World Tax J World Tax Journal 
 
